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InGifts and Social Relations
The Mechanisms of Reciprocity
Aafke Komter
University of Utrechtabstract: In the modern gift literature an anti-utilitarian and a utilitarian view on
the gift can be distinguished. From the anti-utilitarian perspective, the freedom of
the gift is seen as one of its main characteristics, while the idea that gifts are caught
in a cycle of reciprocity is downplayed. In the utilitarian approach, assumptions
about rational actors weighing their preferences according to some utility are pre-
dominant. In the first approach, reciprocity is seen as undermining ‘genuine’ gifts.
The utilitarian approach does take reciprocity into account but fails to analyse why
the principle of reciprocity is so effective. This article attempts to provide such an
explanation. By illuminating both the variety of the forms of the gift and the uni-
versality of the underlying principle, it is argued that gifts reflect a multi-purpose
symbolic ‘utility’ that transcends both utilitarianism and anti-utilitarianism.
keywords: gift-giving ✦ gifts ✦ reciprocity ✦ ritual ✦ social relations ✦ 
(anti-)utilitarianismIntroduction
erely exchanged for some economic profit but they are also,
 Claude Lévi-Strauss, ‘vehicles and instruments for realities
r: influence, power, sympathy, status, emotion; and the skil-
hange consists of a complex totality of maneuvers, conscious
, in order to gain security and to fortify one’s self against risks
gh alliances and rivalry’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1996: 19). This often
 is a beautiful illustration, not only of the complexity of the
functions of gift exchange but also of the fact that it has sur-
ulfils a stabilizing function in the always unpredictable and
ecure interaction with other human beings.
e has a variety of functions, for instance, economic, social,
s, aesthetic and juridical ones, which is why Marcel Mauss
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called it a ‘total social phenomenon’ in his famous 1923 essay on the gift
(Mauss, 1990). In addition to being the expression of love, friendship or
respect, gifts can be used for less noble purposes such as to manipulate,
flatter, bribe, deceive, humiliate, dominate, offend, hurt and even kill, as
in the case of the poisoned cup. That a gift can be meant to kill is most
clearly illustrated in the double meaning of the German (and Dutch) word
Gift, which also means poison. Gift exchange can sustain communities of
any kind, from a group of normal, law-abiding citizens to a community of
scoundrels. In 1908, Georg Simmel wrote that feelings of faithfulness and
gratitude develop in any kind of group that has a certain duration, irre-
spective of its initially connecting motives (Simmel, 1950). Mutual loyalty,
often supported by gifts, connects those involved in collective hostilities
towards third parties as well as those who maintain collective friendships.
Although one of the primary functions of the gift is to create and main-
tain social ties, gifts can also undermine and even annihilate human bonds.
By excessive gift-giving, Shakespeare’s eponymous protagonist in Timon of
Athens tried to buy himself friendship, with the result that all of his former
friends turned against him. In the end, the opposite effect was achieved,
and Timon was left behind in bitter loneliness (Schrover, 1997).
In this article, I take a stance against two influential contemporary
views of the gift: on the one hand, the anti-utilitarian perspective of the
gift that emphasizes its potential to overcome a too economized view of
society, and on the other hand, the utilitarian approach that focuses on
the instrumental rationality of gift-giving practices. My own position is
that human gift-giving is too layered and too complex to be incarcerated
in such a one-dimensional perspective. By illuminating both the variety
of the forms of the gift, and the universality of the underlying principle,
I hope to demonstrate that the gift reflects a multi-purpose symbolic ‘util-
ity’ that transcends both utilitarianism and anti-utilitarianism.
The Object
Virtually anything can be given as a gift: objects used for amusement or
distraction such as books, CDs, DVDs, plants, flowers, objects of art, jew-
ellery, food products, animals, token-gifts, coupons or money. In fact, any
object can come to symbolize an existing or a desired tie to somebody
else, and thereby become a gift: the small shell found on the beach dur-
ing a walk with a lover, a tiny flower freshly picked or a beautiful stone
found in the mountains. Another interesting category of gifts consists
of parts of the human body such as organs or blood (Titmuss, 1970).
Throughout the centuries, people in the most different cultures have sac-
rificed to gods or ancestors (Berking, 1999). Not only animals but occa-
sionally also human beings were involved in ritual slaughter (Komter,
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2005). Turning to non-western cultures, the picture is as varied as it is in
western countries. In his description of the Kula ceremonial, the ritual gift
exchange among the Trobriand Islanders, Malinowski (1922) mentions
not only the well-known arm-shells and necklaces but also, for instance,
piglets, fruits, yams (sweet potatoes), raw food, cooked food, stone axes,
whalebone spoons, betel-nut and tobacco, each gift belonging to a partic-
ular type of occasion and a specific type of relationship.
Gifts can also be non-material. To stay with the Trobrianders: material
gifts were exchanged for non-material possessions such as the knowledge
of magic, or the title to a garden plot. A man could wish to acquire the priv-
ileges due to him by inheritance from a maternal uncle or elder brother
before this person’s death. Yet another non-material gift is the privilege to
execute a dance. Dances were ‘owned’ among the Trobrianders; this means
that the original inventor had the right of ‘producing’ his dance and song
in his village community. Malinowski describes the transaction as follows:
‘If another village takes a fancy to this song and dance, it has to purchase
the right to perform it. This is done by handing ceremonially to the original
village a substantial payment of food and valuables, after which the dance
is taught to the new possessors’ (Malinowski, 1922: 186). Malinowski
emphasizes that it is impossible to draw a fixed line between trade on the
one hand, and the exchange of gifts on the other. His catalogue of gifts indeed
ranges from the ‘pure gift’, given without any expectations of returns, to
forms of pure barter.
In our own culture, we are familiar with non-material gifts such as hos-
pitality and forms of help or care given disinterestedly. In the ancient virtue
of hospitality, caring for the needs of the stranger was considered an
inevitable obligation towards a fellow human being: there was a ‘general
human obligation to hospitality’ (Finley, 1988). The Bible ordains hospital-
ity to strangers as a holy plight. In Homer’s Odyssey the rule of hospitality
was to welcome a guest in your home, offer him food and shelter, and only
afterwards ask questions about his person and mission. The original mean-
ing of hospitality is based on reciprocity and mutual exchange: just as
strangers may need you, you might need them at some future time, and
therefore you should offer them hospitality (Herzfeld, 1987; Pitt-Rivers,
1968). The ritual of hospitality, the sharing of bread and other food, is a pro-
totypical example of the morality of reciprocity. This applies not only to
human beings but also to higher primates, as Frans de Waal (1996) has
demonstrated in his fascinating study among chimpanzees.
The Occasion
Occasions for gift-giving are almost as numerous as there are objects to give;
moreover, they vary between cultures. In our western culture, we are familiar
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with gifts given at weddings, births, funerals, birthday parties, Christmas,
Santa Claus, Valentine’s Day, Mother’s and Father’s Day, exams, promotions,
jubilees, moving house, welcoming or farewell parties. We give when we are
invited to dine with other people, or when we visit an ill friend, we give to
beggars, to the church, to charity. Among the Trobriand people, the variety
of gift occasions is impressive as well. Malinowski mentions a range of dif-
ferent types of gifts given at different occasions. Each gift occasion has its
own name. Kula gifts are not merely objects, but signs of wealth and power.
They possess an individuality, expressed in a personal name and a personal
history connected to them. Before being offered they are placed on display.
As they circulate around the big ring of the islands, they acquire fame and
become renowned among the general public, creating a sensation when they
appear in a given district. Basically, the Kula exchange has always to be a gift
followed by a counter-gift. The principle of give-and-take, or reciprocity, is
the fundamental rule underlying the ceremony. The exchange is opened by
an initial, or opening gift, and closed by a final, or return present. In the cycle
of gift exchange sometimes intermediary gifts are given, tokens of good faith
indicating that the main gift will be returned on a future occasion. Some arti-
cles are particularly liked and desired. In order to compete for the favour of
receiving such a gift, sometimes so-called solicitory gifts are given, gifts
expressing the wish to receive a specific type of gift in return. Another well-
known category of solicitory gifts are those offered to the gods and the spir-
its (Mauss, 1990).
The Ritual
Gifts are symbolically defined as gifts by being wrapped (at least in our
western culture; the Trobriand people do not have this custom). Most
gifts, even those that are unusually large or oddly shaped, are wrapped.
If a gift is not wrapped, for instance a money gift, its appearance is often
altered, for example by inserting it in a self-made picture or work of art.
The important thing is that the gift looks different before and after it has
been given away. People often spend a lot of time and care to selecting
and preparing the wrapping, even though they know that the wrapping
will be torn apart and discarded immediately after the gift has been
given. In Japan, wrapping is a real art in itself. Hendry (1995) describes
how various types of extremely refined wrapping belong to various occa-
sions for gift-giving. For instance, a wrapping with an inextricable knot
is used for a wedding gift, whereas condolence gifts are adorned with a
lotus motif. Japanese shops sell ready-made wrappings for various occa-
sions. There are, for instance, special envelopes for wrapping money and
for New Year presents. In Japan, the function of wrapping is to refine the
object and to add layers of meaning to the gift in its unwrapped form.
International Sociology Vol. 22 No. 1
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The wrapping emphasizes that it is not the object itself but the act of
giving a gift that matters (Cheal, 1988). In Japan, there is a related custom
that supports this interpretation. In that country the immediate opening
of a gift is considered impolite because it is assumed to display too much
interest in the material content of the gift instead of in the sentiment it
expresses (Hendry, 1995). It will be clear that a lack of awareness of the
cultural differences in the language of gift exchange and wrapping tradi-
tions can lead to possible disasters and even the breakdown of relations.
Yet another ritual aspect of gift-giving is the way gifts are presented
and received. Among the Trobriand people, the etiquette of the exchange
‘requires that the gift should be given in an off-hand, abrupt and almost
angry manner, and received with equivalent nonchalance and disdain’
(Malinowski, 1922: 352). Malinowski’s explanation for the part played by
the receiver is that he will always insist on the magnitude and the value
of the gift he gave himself, and minimize those of the gifts received.
Moreover, the receiver will be reluctant to appear in want of anything.
Both these motives combine to produce an attitude of disdain at the
reception of a gift. The angry attitude of the giver might, according to
Malinowski, be an expression of the natural human dislike of having to
part with a possession. In addition, by showing what a wrench it is to
give it away, the giver can enhance the apparent value of the gift.
The ritual of the potlatch, a ceremony of competitive gift-giving and
collective destruction of wealth, is another illustration of the variety of
gift-giving. Mauss has described the potlatch among the Indian soci-
eties of the American Northwest. The system of gift exchange among
these people is characterized by violence, exaggeration and antagonism.
The notion of honour plays a central role. The individual prestige of a
chief and that of his clan is closely linked to what is given. In certain
kinds of potlatch, one must expend all that one has and keep nothing
back. The potlatch is a competition to see who is the richest and the most
madly extravagant. In some cases, gifts are not given and returned but
destroyed: ‘so as not to give the slightest hint of desiring your gift to be
reciprocated. Whole boxes of olachen (candlefish) oil or whale oil are
burnt, as are houses and thousands of blankets. The most valuable cop-
per objects are broken and thrown into the water, in order to put down
and to “flatten” one’s rival’ (Mauss, 1990: 37) Here, gift-giving is clearly
a means to acquire and maintain power and social status.
The Relationship
According to Fiske (1991), there are four basic types of human relationships.
Human activities as diverse as arranging a marriage, performing religious
rituals, making choices, judging what is morally good or wrong, or dealing
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with things or gifts, can be ordered into four fundamental models: ‘commu-
nity sharing’, ‘authority ranking’, ‘equality matching’ and ‘market pricing’.
In ‘community sharing’, things are mainly exchanged on the basis of
feelings of connectedness to other people. What one gives is not depend-
ent on what one has received, but springs from one’s perception of other
people’s needs. In this model, the things given will often be food, care or
services. Another category of giving within this model is based on iden-
tification with other people. An important characteristic of this type of
gifts is their sentimental value. One may think of heirlooms, keepsakes and
any other objects that symbolize precious memories. In all these examples,
gifts are markers of ‘community’.
Within the ‘authority ranking’ model, exchange is motivated by a (con-
scious or unconscious) desire to emphasize one’s own status or power
position. Power, fame, prestige and merit are regarded as the most rele-
vant criteria within social relationships. Valuable things are transacted
with those high in the power hierarchy, whereas sops are good enough
for those in lower positions. In contrast to the community model, the
authority ranking model promotes also showing and exposing valuable
objects, in addition to transacting or giving such items to other people.
Examples are conspicuous consumption, exhibiting prestige items or
symbols of rank and status. In this model, gifts are markers of superior-
ity in power relations.
In ‘equality matching’, people have reciprocal exchange patterns, in which
quid pro quo, or tit-for-tat, is the prevailing motivation. Considerations in
exchange are influenced neither by need nor by merit, status or power. The
items exchanged can often be aligned, weighted or otherwise compared,
enabling the participants to achieve equality by concrete operations of match-
ing. Gifts exchanged in equality matching relationships are tokens of balance.
In ‘market pricing’, people’s main preoccupation in exchange is: do I ben-
efit from the transaction, do the costs involved outweigh the profits?
People’s relationships to others are instrumental, and often characterized
by competition and struggle. One gives to those from whom one may
expect some direct or future benefit. Gifts are tokens of utility or material
(economic) value. How do these relational models affect the motives to
give, or in other words, the spirit of the gift?
The Spirit
Like in the archaic societies described by anthropologists, it is also, to use
Mauss’s term, the spirit of the gift that counts in contemporary western
society, and not so much the content. What motives are involved in gift-
giving in western societies?
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A first category of motives expresses friendship, love, gratitude, respect,
loyalty or solidarity. These gifts have as their main purpose to communi-
cate our positive feelings to the recipient. Some of the motives reported by
the respondents of a Dutch study on gift-giving (Komter, 1996a, 1996b;
Komter and Schuyt, 1993) are strongly other-directed and altruistic: one
wants to contribute to another person’s well-being without thinking about
a return service; one helps or cares because one feels a general moral obli-
gation to do so. However, even such gifts may (consciously or uncon-
sciously) have a strategic aim. For instance, gifts may express our desire to
forgive, to repair for something done wrong in the past, to ease our con-
science, to flatter, to attract attention or to prevent our being forgotten.
Giving to charity is another example of benefiting another person while at
the same time relieving our own conscience.
A very common class of motives relates to insecurity, for instance about
the status of the relationship. As Caplow (1982) argued, the majority of
gifts are given in order to ascertain and fortify relationships that are
deemed important but have not yet been stabilized. In the same vein, reli-
gious offerings may be regarded as attempts to reduce insecurity. By
means of offerings, humans express their gratitude towards the deity,
thereby reducing their insecurity about the hereafter and increasing their
hopes to obtain grace. In general, both gifts based on motives such as love,
respect, gratitude and those springing from insecurity fit into the first model,
described by Fiske (1991): ‘community’.
A second class of motives is based on a need for power and prestige, or
inspired by considerations related to reputation and fame. The resources
the giver and the receiver can dispose of may be very unequally distrib-
uted, giving one party the right to be predominantly in the receiving
position whereas the other party is, or feels obliged to be, mainly in the
role of giver (Gouldner, 1973). By means of abundant gift-giving we are
putting ourselves in a morally superior position, and we may cause the
recipient to feel indebted. Gift-giving as a sign of power is not restricted
to the potlatch but is also a common practice in western society: offering
exquisite banquets, giving expensive bouquets of flowers or organizing
fancy parties – these are all modern examples of potlatch where the recip-
ient is, as it were, stunned by the gift. Giving gifts may serve to dominate,
humiliate and to make others dependent upon our benevolence and our
willingness to share valuables and resources with them.
A related set of motives is inspired by hostility, hate or contempt. Gift-
giving can be a conscious or unconscious act of unfriendliness. We may
give a gift to someone who has affronted us or treated us badly, in order
to let this person sense how ignominious his or her action has been.
Aggression can be the underlying motive of a meagre gift given to some-
body whom we used to bestow with abundant gifts in the past. Excessive
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giving to a person of whom one is intensely jealous and whom one
deeply hates for that reason is another example of (disguised) aggression
as a motive to give (A. Freud, 1986). Both the gifts motivated by power
and those inspired by hostility would fit into Fiske’s relational model of
‘authority ranking’.
A third, and large category of motives is related to psychological expec-
tations of reciprocity and equality. The underlying idea is that favours have
to be reciprocated with the equivalence: I will give you something, because
I expect that you will return my gift in due time or when necessary (for
instance in the case of help). Empirical research in the Netherlands shows
that most of the motives reported by our respondents are of this type
(Komter, 1996b). There is a propensity to give, but before doing so an inner
calculus is made about the respective participants’ position on the ‘debt-
balance’ (Schwartz, 1996). Feelings of being morally obliged to return a gift,
and not purely altruistic motives are the main psychological impetus to
reciprocal giving. Here we have the class of motives corresponding with
Fiske’s model of ‘equality’.
A fourth class of motives is based on implicit or explicit self-interest. Such
gifts can be given with the purpose to manipulate, corrupt, blackmail or
bribe. Many gifts in the sphere of public life are hardly covering up the self-
interest that motivated them, for instance, the pharmaceutical industry
offering golf weekends to GPs and their partners, concluded by a light sci-
entific programme on the advantages of certain pharmaceutical products.
Particularly, the larger business gifts are on the brink of bribe. Money gifts
may be used for all kinds of dubitable aims: as hush or redemption money,
or as a means to obtain certain societal or political gains. Fiske’s relational
model of the ‘market’ covers the motives of gifts given in this spirit.
The Principle
In the modern gift literature two ways of looking at the gift can be distin-
guished: an anti-utilitarian and a utilitarian view. Caillé (2000), founder of La
Revue du MAUSS (Mouvement Anti-Utilitariste en Sciences Sociales), is a rep-
resentative of the first approach. He objects to an overly economized view of
society, encountered in certain branches of social science such as rational
choice theory, and emphasizes the theoretical potential of the gift to serve as
a paradigm for a critical understanding of contemporary society. In a similar
vein, Godbout (1992) emphasizes how important aspects of human relation-
ships such as forgiveness, love, respect, dignity, compassion are fostered by
the gift. Calculation and reciprocity are not central to the gift, according to
him. From the anti-utilitarian perspective, the freedom of the gift is seen as
one of its main characteristics, whereas the idea that gifts are fundamentally
caught in a cycle of reciprocity, as had so convincingly been argued by Mauss,
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is played down. Similarly, in some deconstructionist approaches to the gift,
attempts at recompense or reciprocity are seen as destroying the possibility
of a ‘genuine gift’ (Derrida, 1991); implicit is the idea that real gifts are truly
altruistic and are, or should be, ‘unspoiled’ by expectations or acts of reci-
procity. Finally, Alan Schrift, in his collection of classical and modern essays
on the gift, argues that ‘a narrowly self-interested notion of reciprocal return’
(Schrift, 1997: 19) has come to dominate the current discourse on giving, and
advocates viewing the gift as a potential ethic of generosity.
In the ‘utilitarian’ approach, assumptions of rational actors weighing their
preferences according to some utility are predominant. In this mainly eco-
nomical tradition, researchers attempt to unravel the enigmas with which
the phenomenon of gift-giving is confronting them: gifts are ‘inefficient’ (e.g.
givers buy goods different from those receivers would like), and gift-giving
cannot be explained by the mere maximizing of one’s self-interest. Stark
(1995) argues that motives to give can range from pure altruism to pure self-
interest. People care not only about their own material payoffs, but also
about such things as fairness, equity and reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter,
2000; Thomas and Worrall, 2002). Social (non-selfish) preferences and con-
text-dependent factors have to be taken into account when explaining the
gift (Fehr and Smith, 1999;  Henrich et al., 2004; Sobel, 2005). Gifts can be
seen as economic signals and social symbols (Camerer, 1988). It is interest-
ing to see that insights already firmly established within the fields of
anthropology (such as the range of motives to give) and sociology (for
example, the contextual dependency and symbolic signal-functions of the
gift) are gradually being rediscovered by economists.
In the first, anti-utilitarian approach, reciprocity is opposed to the
freedom of genuine gifts and real generosity. The economists’ approach
investigates the nature of the preferences of the actors involved in recip-
rocal exchange but fails to provide an analysis why the principle of reci-
procity is so effective. Here I would like to attempt such an explanation.
There are (at least) five elements in the principle of reciprocity that deter-
mine its effectiveness: (1) the survival value of gift-giving; (2) the recog-
nition of the other implied in reciprocity; (3) the three obligations
involved in it; (4) the morally binding character of reciprocity; and (5) the
fact that reciprocity combines generosity and self-interest.
At the beginning of this article, I pointed at the survival value of gift-
giving highlighted in the quotation by Lévi-Strauss. As Mary Douglas has
stated in her foreword to the English translation of Mauss’s essay, the the-
ory of the gift is a theory of human solidarity. Human solidarity is deeply
founded in the idea that it is in the collective interest of all to cooperate
and exchange services and gifts with others (Komter, 2005). The survival
value of gift-giving can most clearly be witnessed in studies of animal
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behaviour. Primatologist Frans de Waal (1996) describes the workings of
the principle of reciprocity in a community of chimpanzees. Chimps share
and exchange food and groom one another on the basis of this principle:
those who deviate from the rule by not grooming others or sharing food
with them, will not be groomed or allowed to participate in food-sharing
practices themselves. They are, so to speak, excommunicated, which is
obviously disadvantageous for their survival chances. Evolutionary biol-
ogists such as Trivers (1971) and Dawkins (1976) have analysed the evo-
lutionary advantages of so-called reciprocal altruism. Among animals as
well as humans, altruistic behaviour serves the preservation of the mem-
bers of the species because it is reciprocated by similar behaviour
displayed by others. In the words of the psychologist Ronald Cohen:
‘Because giving is such an adaptive feature for the maintenance of social
life, it is so ubiquitous among human societies’ (Cohen, 1978: 96).
A second aspect of the principle of reciprocity is its implicit assumption
of the recognition of the other person as a potential ally. The social and
cultural system on which archaic societies were based rested on the
mutual acceptance of the other as partner in gift exchange. Recognition 
of the other as a human being proves to be an essential precondition for
the coming into being of patterns of exchange. Without recognition of the
person and his or her identity, no reciprocal exchange is possible. The sig-
nificance of recognition of the other is echoed in the accounts of both clas-
sical and contemporary thinkers. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam
Smith developed some views on the mirroring of the imaginary view-
points of the other in our own minds (Smith, 2002). These internalized
others serve as the basis of our moral sensitivity. In the 20th century,
similar ideas were elaborated upon by George Herbert Mead (1962).
Similarly, in Hannah Arendt’s view (1978) adoption of the plurality of
other people’s viewpoints in our own minds is the only way to transcend
our own, interest-driven self and the limitations of our own judgement.
Recognition of the humanity of self and other is tantamount to recogni-
tion of the interdependency of self and other, and interdependency is
the basis for social bonds and human solidarity. For the recognition of
humanity implies that other people’s needs and their mutual depend-
ency for the fulfilment of these needs are recognized. More recently, the
German social philosopher Honneth (1992) analyses reciprocity as an
issue of recognition. In order to be able to feel self-respect, people need
the respect and regard of others. Also Habermas (1989) regards identity
as the result of processes of mutual recognition, and reciprocal recognition
as a basic assumption underlying social ties and solidarity. According to
him, the basic principles of modern solidarity are not fundamentally dif-
ferent from the mutual expectations of reciprocity existing in premodern
societies.
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A third core aspect of the reciprocity principle is manifested in Mauss’s
famous statement about the three obligations: the obligation to give, the
obligation to receive and the obligation to reciprocate. The principle of
reciprocity is succinctly symbolized in this threefold obligation. As
Mauss has pointed out, to refuse to give, to fail to invite, but also to refuse
to accept, is tantamount to declaring war. It is not the refusal of the object
itself, but the rejection of the bond of alliance that is at stake here. As long
as the recipient of a gift has not given back, the giver holds a certain
power over the recipient. This power is equivalent to ‘the spirit of the
gift’. This spirit is believed to wish to return to the original giver. The
thing given is invested with life and seeks to return to its place of origin.
Things circulating in the hands of men and women are the constituents
of the principle of reciprocity. As a consequence of these obligations, a
perpetual cycle of exchanges is set up within and between generations.
Social ties are created, sustained and strengthened by means of reciprocal
gifts. These acts of gift exchange are at the basis of human solidarity.
A fourth aspect, implied in the third one, is the morally binding char-
acter of reciprocity. The three obligations are not enforced by some exter-
nal power, but are internalized moral duties. Having received a gift
causes a feeling of gratitude to arise, and gratitude can be considered the
moral force that brings us to return the gift (Komter, 2005). In his article
‘Faithfulness and Gratitude’, Simmel argues that all contacts among
human beings rest on the scheme of giving and returning the equiva-
lence, and that a large part of these exchanges can be enforced by the law
(Simmel, 1950). Gratitude is, according to Simmel, a supplement of the
legal order. In relationships that lie outside the realm of the law – and this
applies to the entire network of informal social ties between human
beings – gratitude acts as the force that binds people to one another in an
informal social contract. Without the moral obligation implied in grati-
tude, there would be no basis for trust and endurable social relationships.
Finally, one can wonder why the informal contract generated by reci-
procity is so effective in creating the social cement of society. The answer
lies in the sublime reconciliation of individual and social interests result-
ing from it. Reciprocity represents the elegant combination of self-interested
concerns with the requirements of social life. As Marcel Mauss said:
‘Material and moral life, and exchange, function . . . in a form that is both
disinterested and obligatory’ (Mauss, 1990: 33). According to Mauss, gen-
erosity and self-interest are linked in the act of gift-giving. The thought
that altruism and egoism are not contradictory in gift-giving is highly illu-
minating. Gifts have the superb characteristic of being at the same time
free and obligatory, altruistic and self-oriented. It is exactly this double-
sidedness of the gift that makes it such a fortunate solution for the fragility
and insecurity inherent in any newly developing social relationship.
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Conclusions
We have seen that there is an endless variation in the objects used for
gifts, the occasions at which gifts are given and the rituals surrounding
gift-giving, and that there are huge cultural differences in each of these
aspects of the gift. Moreover, the spirit of the gift varies from disinter-
ested generosity to the seeking of personal gain, with numerous shades
and gradations in-between. Therefore, my first conclusion is that the gift
does not exist, in the sense that there is not one general, unequivocal and
non-ambiguous sense in which to understand the gift.
Second, there is nothing inherent in the gift that makes it morally good
or bad. Gifts can help to maintain social ties between shrewd business
partners lusting for money and power, or those who have outright crim-
inal intentions, as well as between those striving to realize some noble
aim or collective interest. Gifts can be altruistic and agonistic, beneficial
as well as detrimental. The moral meaning of the gift depends on the
nature of the social relationship within which it is given, and on the con-
scious and unconscious purposes and motives of those involved in that
relationship.
A third conclusion, then, concerns the nature of social relationships and
their connection to the spirit of the gift. I described four basic types of
relationships between human beings, respectively based on community,
authority, equality and market, and stated that each of these four rela-
tional models corresponds to a specific category of motives to give.
My fourth conclusion pertains to the principle of reciprocity underly-
ing the gift. Five elements of reciprocity seem to determine its supreme
efficacy: its survival value, the recognition of the other, the three obliga-
tions implied in it, the moral bond it creates and finally, the combination
of altruistic and self-oriented concerns represented in it. The different
assumptions about human nature underlying anti-utilitarianism and util-
itarianism do not exclude each other. Human beings are both generous
and calculative, sometimes even both at the same time. The gift reflects a
multi-purpose symbolic ‘utility’ (Khalil, 1997) that transcends both utili-
tarianism and anti-utilitarianism.
Like the gift, reciprocity is not morally good in and of itself: reciprocal
actions do not necessarily lead to a better society. Moreover, reciprocity not
only means that gifts are followed by counter-gifts, but it can also take the
negative form of revenge answered by counter-revenge: an eye for an eye, a
tooth for a tooth (Gouldner, 1973). As Frans de Waal (1996: 136) rightly
observes: ‘Reciprocity can exist without morality; there can be no morality
without reciprocity.’ 
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